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AppendicesI. Introduction
The financial needs of corporations are generally met by borrow-
ing in financial markets and equity participation of investors.
In a similar way countries are able to obtain necessary external
financing through international loans or by attracting foreign
direct investment. In the case of developing countries foreign
aid constitutes an additional source of foreign capital inflows.
Looking at the major borrowers in Latin-America with severe debt
service problems it can be stated that foreign borrowing clearly
dominates the external financial structure of these countries,
with foreign aid flows being negligible. The heavy reliance on
foreign debt in these countries has triggered proposals that
recommend a stronger role of FDI as a mean for solving the debt
problems .
These proposals look at the choice between debt financing and
foreign direct investment mainly from the viewpoint of restoring
and stabilizing the developing countries' ability to meet their
repayment obligations. It is assumed that the flexible repayment
schedule in the case of foreign investment provides a better fit
between the country's ability to pay and its repayments and,
thus, helps to alleviate the repayment problems of developing
countries. The general availability of FDI is not questioned. For
evaluating the potential scope of foreign direct investment ver-
sus foreign loans it seems necessary to take also into account
the incentives to international investors for providing either
foreign loans or FDI. One important determinant for the profita-
bility of loans and direct investment that affects the investors'
willingness to engage in these forms of financing is given by the
borrowing countries' investment response to debt financing and
the amount of additional investment in the case of FDI respecti-
vely. The international investor maximizes his investment returns
See e.g. World Development Report 1985. The World Bank, Wa-
shington D.C. and H. Robert Heller, "The Debt Crisis and the
Future of International Bank Lending". AER, Papers and Pro-
ceedings 77 (1987), 2, 171-175.by providing optimal amounts of debt and FDI subject to the coun-
try's investment behavior that can be seen as reflecting the
country's or its government's utility function.
Principal-agent analysis seems to be especially appropriate for
dealing with those contracts involving incentive problems . The
principal-agent approach is mainly used in the analysis of share-
cropping between a landlord (the principal) and his tenants (the
agents) and in the theory of the firm where ownership and manage-
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ment are separated . Thereby, it is noted that the tenant's in-
centive to produce depends on his contractual obligations to the
landlord in terms of variable share-cropping and fixed rent pay-
ments. Equivalently, the shares of equity and debt liabilities of
a firm influence the managers' incentives to engage in profit
maximization and, thus, to invest efficiently. Principal-agent
analysis suggests that in the case of a risk-avers agent fixed
commitments to the principal strenghten the agent's incentive for
production, while agreements on output-sharing meet the agent's
demand for risk reduction . The first application of principal-
agent analysis to development finance has been provided by Lach-
4
ler . Lachler analyses the country's choice between external fi-
See e.g. Oliver Hart, Bengt Holmstrom, "The Theory of Con-
tracts". In: Truman F. Bewley (Ed.), Advances in Economic Theo-
ry. Cambridge 1987, 71-155.
2
See e.g. Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Incentives and Risk Sharing in
Sharecropping". Review of Economic Studies 41 (1974), 2, 219-
257 and Michael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling, "Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Struc-
ture". Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (1976), 4, 305-360.
Another early analysis of the principal-agent problem has been
provided by James Mirlees, "Notes on Welfare Economics, Infor-
mation and Uncertainty". In: M. Balch, D. McFadden, S. Wu
(Ed.), Essays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty. Amsterdam
1974, 243-258.
See e.g. Ray Rees, "The Theory of Principal and Agent, Part I".
Bulletin of Economic Research, 37 (1985), 1, 3-26 and J. Micha-
el Cummins, "Incentive Contracting for National Defense: A
Problem of Optimal Risk Sharing". The Bell Journal of Econo-
mics 8 (1977), 1, 168-185.
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Ulrich Lachler, Debt versus Equity in Development Finance. Kiel
Institute of World Economics, Working Paper 248, Dec. 1985.nancing by foreign debt and foreign direct investment (equity)
under the assumption that the country maximizes its welfare func-
tion. His conclusion from the theoretical analysis is in line
with those proposals that claim a stronger role for FDI in de-
velopment finance. However, Lachler's as well as other analyses
disregard whether there are at all incentives to the internatio-
nal investor (the principal) for providing equity rather than
debt to developing countries.
In the following, section 2 introduces the Lachler-model and
analyses the problems that arise from the assumption of welfare
maximization of the transfer receiving country (the agent). In
section 3 the principal-agent model is modified by assuming that
the principal maximizes his utility and chooses the optimal
structure of debt and equity transfers accordingly. With the
principal's calculus being decisive for the debt-equity structure
of the transfer to the agent the question arises if the agent is
able to reach a more favourable transfer structure by changing
the institutional framework that governs the transfer. Public
guarantees for private debt obligations may serve as an example
for a modified institutional setting that affects the profitabi-
lity of debt and equity transfers for the principal and, thus,
his willingness to provide these two types of transfers. To
concentrate on the analysis of guarantee schemes seems to be
justified because explicit and implicit public guarantees are a
regular feature of the external financing of developing coun-
tries. Hence, in section 4 the model is extended to a setting
with two agents (the government and the private sector) that
allows the analysis of public guarantee schemes for private debt.2. A Principal-Agent Model of International Capital Transfers
The Lachler model assumes that the principal (the international
investor) provides a given transfer (T1) to the agent (the coun-
try) in period 1 and receives repayment in period 2. The agent
uses the transfer for consumption and investment in period 1
according to his utility function. The agent's investment takes
place after the disbursement of the transfer. Investment in the
first period (I.) yields output in second period (Q~) which is
used for consumption and repayment. The repayment consists of two
claims: a fixed repayment [B] and a variable payment that is
defined as a proportion of the agent's second period output after
deducting the fixed repayment [(1-n)(Q2(I-)-B)] . The agent's
second period output is determined by the agent's investment
according to his production function and a stochastic disturbance
term as shown by the following expression:
Qo = x F (I1 ) with F' > 0, F" <_ 0
The random variable x assumes values in the non-negative internal
(0, x), subject to a known probability distribution describe by
the density function, g(x). It has a mean equal to 1 and a finite
2
variance . The principal receives full repayment on his fixed
claim as long as x F(I1) >. B < = > 'x >. F(I1)/B = b. In the case of
the agent's second period output being lower than his fixed obli-
gation B the principal receives the whole second period output as
repayment.
The agent's utility function is of the von Neumann-Morgenstern
type. The agent is risk-avers and maximizes his utility over the
two periods:
The fixed repayment includes interest and principal of the
debt. Thus, an equivalent treatment of equity requires that the
variable repayment includes the profit share and desinvestment.
Restricting the repayments to the interest payments and the
profit-shares would not affect the analysis, but only leave the
country with stocks of foreign debt and direct investment at
the end of the second period.
2 Lachler (1985), p. 4.- - ?
EU = UitYi+Tx"
1!]
 + P y U2[xF(I1)-B-(l-n) (xF (^)-B) ] g (x) dx
x
<=> EU = u1 CY1-I-T:L—i^3 + p y" UjinFdjXx-bJlalxjdx
b
With Y- denoting the agent's initial endowment and |3 representing
the time preference rate.
The expected value of repayments to the principal calculated in
period 1 results from the following expression:
x b x
T=B /'g(x)dx+F{I®) /^xg(x)dx+(l-n)[ / F(I®)(x-b)g(x)dx]
e j*
< = > T = F(l!f)[l-n / (x-b)g(x)dx]
The notion of I., refers to the fact that the principal has no
information on the agent's investment decision when he provides
the transfer. The principal derives expected investment from the
agent's utility function.
Lachler assumes that the principal is indifferent with regard to
the composition . of the repayments in terms of fixed debt and
variable equity repayment as long as the expected value of the
total repayment stays constant. Under this assumption Lachler
derives the properties of a so-called cooperative case where the
agent maximizes his utility by choosing an optimal combination of
debt and equity transfers subject to the constraint of a constant
repayment value. The expected value of the repayments does not
only depend on the agreed debt and equity claims, but also on the
agent's investment decision. Thus, the cooperative case also
requires the ex ante commitment of the agent to a specific first
period investment. Precommitment of the first period investment
is necessary because after the transfer has taken place the agentcan reach a higher utility level by cutting back investment,
thereby reducing the principal's expected repayments. As long as
the agent is not able to commit himself ex ante credibly to the
higher investment level the principal expects him to reduce in-
vestment ex post and does not agree to the proposed debt and
equity repayments in the cooperative transfer case.
Basically, the agent's inability to reach a cooperative transfer
agreement is a problem of the country's sovereignty. The problem
of sovereign risk can be reduced by the use of self-enforcing
2
contracts . For that reason the second, non-cooperative, case
analysed by Lachler seems to be more realistic. In this case the
principal and the agent agree on a combination of debt and equity
repayments with an associated investment level that satisfies two
conditions: firstly, the principal's repayment constraint is
satisfied, and secondly, the agent's optimal investment level
does not change after the transfer has taken place. One may in-
terpret this situation as one where the principal sets the terms
of the transfer and thus gains control over the transfer process,
as it is done by Lachler . But the fact remains that the agent's
utility is maximized subject to the additional constraint that
the agent's investment level stays constant after the transfer
has taken place. Given the constraint that the transfer takes
place in a "non-cooperative" setting because of sovereign risk,
the debt-equity structure of a transfer choosen by the utility
maximizing agent coincides with the transfer structure as it is
set by the principal.
The assumption that in every case the expected repayments to the
principal stay constant and all benefits from improved repayment
terms accrue to the agent appears to be the main problem of the
1 See Lachler (1985), p. 16.
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See Volker Stiiven, Incentive Effects of Self-enforcing Con-
tracts in International Lending. Kiel Institute of World Econo-
mics, Working Paper 341, Nov. 1988.Lachler model. The principal receives just the minimal expected
repayment value he requires for providing the transfer at all.
This result characterizes the situation of a competitive supply
of foreign transfers where the rate of return of every transfer
is determined by the market rate. This setting does not seem
appropriate for an analysis of the external financing of develop-
ing countries, especially if these countries do already face
repayment problems. In this case external financing is dominated
by bank consortia that are obviously able to set the terms of new
debt inflows. But even if the country tries to attract new for-
eign direct investments e.g. through debt-equity swaps, the swap
terms must be favourably enough to induce the banks to provide
the necessary "old" debt claims. For debt-equity swaps to be
effective the country must pay a subsidy to foreign investors
using the debt-equity swap mechanism . Higher subsidies enable
the foreign investors to pay higher prices for the banks' "old"
debt claims and, thus, increases the banks' willingness to par-
ticipate in the swap. But higher subsidies reduce the profitabi-
lity of FDI inflows for the country. Modifying the Lachler model
by introducing a profit maximizing principal who sets the terms
of the transfer, i.e. the debt-equity structure of the repay-
ments, may thus represent a first step towards a more realistic
analysis of the external financing of developing countries.
See e.g. D.L. Roberts, E.M. Remolana, Debt Swaps: A Technique
in Developing Country Finance. In: Group of Thirty (Ed.), Fi-
nance for Developing Countries. New York 1987, 15-40.3. Transfer Repayment Maximization by the Principal in Interna-
tional Lending
The preceding discussion has shown that the assumed behavior of
the creditor and investor who acts as the principal to the
transfer receiving country needs some further elaboration. Under
the Lachler model the principal does only require the expected
repayments to meet a certain target value that is specified by
the market interest rate and the borrower's risk-premium. As long
as the expected value of the repayments stays constant the prin-
cipal is indifferent with regard to the structure, of the repay-
ments in terms of debt service and profit claims. Specifically,
the principal is not interested in maximizing the repayment value
by writing appropriate repayment contracts.
Provided that the transfer receiving country, the agent, is risk-
avers the principal's indifference with regard to the repayment
structure leads to pure equity repayments in the cooperative
case. In the non-cooperative case the principal sets the terms of
repayment to secure his expected repayment value, but takes into
account the utility function of the agent. It follows that higher
risk-aversion of the agent induces the principal to choose higher
equity shares for the repayment structure. For that reasons the
Lachler model does not seem to provide a sufficient explanation
for the dominance of debt flows compared to equity in the inter-
national financing of developing countries. Alternatively, the
strong relience on debt may reflect the interests of the princi-
pal, as a creditor and'investor, who maximizes his repayments. In
this case the basic model must be modified to allow for profit
maximization on the side of the principal . The following analy-
sis will elaborate this approach. It will be shown that the re-
cognition of profit maximizing behavior of the principal shifts
of the optimal transfer structure towards debt compared to the
results of Lachler.
See e.g. James Mirlees, "The Optimal Structure of Authority and
Incentives Within an Organization". The Bell Journal of Econo-
mics 7 (1976), 105-131 and Mirlees (1974), and Bengt Holmstrom,
"Moral Hazard and Observability". The Bell Journal of Economics
10 (1979), 74-91.The basic model is modified by introducing utility maximizing
behavior on the side of the principal. As in the basic model the
principal is risk-neutral and, thus, only interested in the
expected value of the transfer repayment. Utility maximization is
equivalent to the maximization of the expected repayment for a
given transfer. The principal is no longer indifferent with
regard to the debt-equity structure of the transfer repayment,
but chooses the combination of fixed debt claims and variable
equity claims that maximizes the expected value of the repayment,
subject to at least constant utility of the borrowing agent.
Using the terminology of the basic model the transfer situation
is non-cooperative because the principal chooses the terms of
transfer under the assumption of utility maximizing behavior of
the agent.
In solving the principal's maximization problem, i.e. choosing
the optimal combination of debt and equity claims, the utility
calculus of the agent must be taken into account for two reasons.
Firstly, changes in the debt-equity structure of the transfer
repayments must leave the agent with constant utility; secondly,
the principal must take into account the agent's investment in-
centives that result from changing debt and equity obligations.
The calculus for the borrowing country (the agent) is the same as
in the Lachler model [Fl - F4] :
x
EU = U1[Y + T - I] + p f U2[nF(I)(x-b)] g(x)dx
b










Time-subscripts are suppressed for notational convenience ex-
cept for the utility function.10
51
n f ui[• = U'[•] + PF
1(I) n f U'[•] xg(x)dx - [F4]
Given the terms of the transfer (B,l-n), the agent maximizes his
utility by choosing an investment level that leads to 5EU/5I = 0.
Changes in the debt-equity structure of the transfer affect the
agent's optimal investment. The investment incentives that result
from variations of the debt and equity claims are derived by
differentiating 5EU/5I with respect to "B" and "1-n":






J U£[-] xg(x)dx - pnF'(I) f U£[-]F'(I)(x-b)xg(x)dx [F6]
515(1-n) . b " b
"V"
> 0
While an increase of the fixed debt claim always leads to posi-
tive investment incentives for the agent [F5], the effect of an
increased variable equity claim is indeterminate. The first term
of [F6] refers to the negative substitution effect on investment
due to the reduced marginal productivity of investments that
results from an increased equity share. The second term charac-
terizes an income effect and is clearly positive. Higher variable
equity claims result in lower income of the agent and at the
lower income level the marginal utility of investment is higher
because marginal utility is decreasing in income. Thus, the in-
come effect from an increased equity share on the agent's invest-
ment incentives works along the same line as in the case of
higher debt that does also reduce the agent's income level.11
Turning to the expected repayments to the principal, its value is
equivalent to the basic model :
T = F(I
e)[l-n f (x-b) g(x)dx] with I
e = I* = I
b
We proceed by calculating first the partial derivatives of T with
2
respect to B and (l-fl) ; subsequently these results are combined
with the condition for constant expected utility of the agent.
= n f g(x)dx + F'(I) fj. [1-n J (x-b) g(x)dx] 5T





b g(x)dx • F'(I)
b dF{I) dB
X X
= n f g(x)dx + F'(I) ^f. [1-n f xg(x)dx] >. 0 [F7]
b dB b
The effect of higher investments on the expected value of the
repayments is clearly non-negative:
T = F(I)[l-n f
X (x-b)] g(x)dx
b





 B F'(I) =-
 b
F(I) dl (F(I))2 F(I)
= >
 hJL = F
1 (I) [1-n f
X xg(x)dx] >. 0
51 b
2
For the applicability of the first-order approach see William
P. Rogerson, "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Prob-
lems". Econometrica 53 (1985), 1357-1367.12
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The sign of the derivative [F8] seems to be indeterminate if
dl/d(l-f1) < 0. However, the analysis of the agent's optimal
behavior shows that the case of dl/d(l-n) < 0 is only possible if
the derivative [F8] is negative, too. Otherwise, i.e. 5T/5(l-n) >
0, the agent's new consumption pattern would be characterized by
lower investments and higher expected repayments. This pattern
cannot be optimal for the agent because utility maximization
requires that an exogenous increase of the expected repayment
leads to increased investments as it is shown in the following:
EU = U1 [y + T - I] + PU2[F{I) - T]
5E
U = - u« [•] + pu: [•] (F- (i) - 55
61
 L * 61
5T Comparison with [F4] shows that F' (I) - zrz: >_ 0.
52E
U = p (F
1 (I) - 55 U"t-] (-D 1 0
5I5T 51
The case of dl/d(l-(l) < 0 is thus only consistent with 5T/5(l-n)
< 0. This, in turn, signifies a situation where the principalBibliothek
de$ Insfifuts fur Weitwirtschaft
13
does not maximize the expected repayments because he relies too
heavily on equity claims. The reduction of (1-n) which increases
both the expected repayments value and, because of 5EU/5(l-n)
£0, the agent's utility represents a pareto improvement that is
always realized. Therefore, the case of dl/d(l-n) < 0 can be
ruled out. In the case of a positive investment response of the
agent after an increase of (1-n) the expected repayments are
clearly non-decreasing.
The analysis of the principal's maximization calculus alone leads
to the results that the expected repayments are strictly increas-
ing with the fixed debt and variable equity claims. Both varia-
tions induce higher investments by the agent. The optimal struc-
ture of debt and equity claims can only be determined if it is
taken into account that the principal needs to preserve a speci-
fic minimum utility level of the agent. This minimum utility may
be derived from the agent's utility without any transfer or from
his utility before the adjustment of the terms of transfer takes
place.
The condition of at least constant utility of the agent leads to
a constraint for changes in the debt-equity structure of repay-
ments :
dEU = ™ dB +
 5E
U d (1-n) = 0
5B 5(l-n)







Combining this constraint and the partial derivatives of the
expected repayment value with respect to 'B' and '(1-n)' [F7 and
F8] allows to evaluate the profitability of shifts in favour of
the fixed debt claim. For an increase of B and the associated14
reduction of (1-n) to increase the expected repayments the fol-
lowing inequality must be met:
5T _ 5T 5EU/5B > Q [pl0]
6B 6(l-n) 5EU/6(l-n)
Substituting the respective terms into this condition leads to
very extensive formulas that make the identification of valid
parameter values rather improbable. We thus try to ease the
problem by solving for a more specific inequality.
The simplification of the inequality [F10] takes advantage of the
fact that the partial derivatives 5T/5B and 5T/5(l-n) contain
very similar terms that are only different with regard to the
agent's investment response to variations of the fixed and var-
iable claims [5I/5B, 51/5(1-n)]. In the case of an increased
variable equity claim the substitution effect is contrary to the
income effect; whereas no substitution effect occurs in the case
of an increased fixed debt claim. Thus, the agent's investment
response to an increase in B should be stronger than the one
resulting from an increase of (l-fl), given that both variations
in the terms of transfer have the same effect on the expected
value of the transfer repayments.
Under this condition the following difference is always positive
and favours the shift of the debt-equity structure towards a
higher debt claim.
X X




B > 0 [Fll]
dB b d(l-n) b 5EU/5(l-n)
Removing the terms of [Fll] from condition [F10] gives a more
specific inequality [F12] with the property that each parameter
constellation that meets this inequality does also fulfill the
general condition [F10].15
X X
n /g(x)dx] - F(I) /* (x-b)g(x)dx
 5EU/5
B >. 0 [F12]
b b 5EU/5(l-n)
[F12] allows to identify a subsample of cases in which the prin-
cipal maximizes his expected repayments by raising the fixed debt
claim and reducing the variable equity claim, subject to constant
utility of the agent.
As a point of reference the analysis starts with the optimal
structure of transfers to an agent who has not received any trans-
fer yet and has thus no repayment obligations [n =1, B = 0].
From this it follows that the difference [Fll] is zero and condi-
tion [F12] is fully equivalent to condition [F10]. Moreover, with
(B = 0, n = 1) [F12] can be reduced substantially and it is shown
that the condition [F12] is not met in the initial situation of
(B = 0, n = 1), which means that pure equity financing is optimal
in this case.
After replacing [5EU/5B]/ [5EU/5(l-n)] by the extended formula
from [F9] the substitution of (B = 0, n = 1) into [F12] leads to
the following results
- - -PH / U'[.]g(x)dx
n /"g(x)dx] - F(I) f (x-b)g(x)dx bj
b b
U£[-](x-b)g(x)dx
x x j t,
< = > / g(x)dx] - / xg(x)dx 0 < 0
0 <T
=1 =1 >116
The fulfillment of [F12] is necessary for debt transfers to be
optimal in the case of an agent who has not received transfers up
to this point. The analysis shows that for the first transfer the
condition [F12] is never met and the principal maximizes his ex-
pected repayments by relying on pure equity financing.
Positive equity claims of the principal from past transfers with
debt still zero (fi < 1 at the time of the new transfer) reduce
the profitability of further equity transfers relative to debt if
the following condition is met: In the initial situation {B = 0,
n = 1) the general condition [F10] is clearly negative and [Fll]
is equal to zero. With the beginning of equity transfers
(^(l-n)>0) [Fll] takes on it's positive value and, thus, works in
favour of a higher profitability of debt relative to equity. At
the same time the equity transfers increase the negative value of
[F12] by reducing the value of Fl j g(x)dx. This effect
strengthens the relative profitability of equity transfers. The
overall effect on the general condition [F10] must increase the
value of [F10] to be favourable for future debt transfers in-
stead of equity transfers. This requires that the increase in
the positive difference of [Fll] must compensate the reduction of
x
n f g(x)dx. The partial derivative of [Fll] with respect to
b 1




[fl fg(x)dx] = 1.
(x-b)g(x)dx
is decreasing in (1-C1) and, thus, leads generally to an in-
creased profitability of fixed debt claims as part of the re-
payment structure.17
F,{I) E dl _ dl 5EU/5B
dB d(l-n) 5EU/5(l-n)




B ] i 1
5B 5(l-n) 5EU/5(l-n)
F
1 (I) ^ 1
Rising equity claims decrease the principal's incentive to pro-
vide further equity financing the higher the agent's marginal
productivity of investment. Countries with high investment pro-
ductivities and, consequently, good growth prospects can be ex-
pected to show high investment ratios, too. Lenders should be
more willing to provide debt financing for these countries than
equity financing.
If the decision on the relative profitability of debt and equity
transfers is made in a situation with already existing fixed debt
obligations of the agent (b > 0), this does also result in a more
favourable judgement of further debt claims as part of the re-
payment structure irrespective of the scale of existing equity
claims. Certainly an increase of b reduces the first term of
x
[F12] but the decrease of J (x-b)g(x)dx in the second term of










which represents the remaining part of the second term of [F12].
Finally, a higher b increases the positive difference [Fll]. The
total effect of a higher b is, thus, favourable for the fulfill-
ment of the general condition [F10]. The positive effect of18
higher debt-output ratios on the principal's incentive to shift
the structure in favour of debt is remarkable. It implies a self-
strengthening effect of debt financing that makes the existence
of an optimal mixed transfer structure with debt and equity un-
likely. The initial transfers to an agent are optimally supplied
as equity financing. However, the increase of the outstanding
equity claims from past transfers strengthens the principal's
incentive to switch towards debt. The incentive effects from the
initial debt claims may be strong enough to displace equity fi-
nancing fully. In this case two different patterns of development
finance may evolve: the first one with low transfer amounts and
pure equity financing, and the second with high transfers that
are fully supplied through debt financing .
In summary, the model outlined in this section differs from the
basic model in considering that the structure of the external
financing of developing countries is also determined by the
willingness of foreign creditors and investors to provide the
transfers. In this connection the incentives for profit maxi-
mizing capital suppliers to shift from equity to debt finance
under certain conditions may explain the rapid increase of exter-
nal debt in LDC financing in the 1970s and early 1980s.
A further note is possible with respect to the case of a risk-
neutral agent (see Appendix I).19
4. The Effects from Public Guarantees for Private Debt
Obviously, the simple principal-agent model that has been ana-
lysed in the preceding sections is only a rough picture of the
incentive structure prevailing in international finance. One
important simplification is the omission of the private sector in
the borrowing country. The government of a borrowing country
surely does not have full control over the domestic investment
ratio. The total investments are simultaneously determined by the
investment decisions of the public and the private sector, and
international financial flows are also directed to both sectors.
Under the assumption that one creditor makes transfers to both
sectors the creditor acts as the principal of two agents and aims
at maximizing the total expected repayments from both agents. The
principal uses three instruments for maximizing repayments: the
distribution of the given total transfer to the private and the
public agent, and the transfer structure in terms of debt and
equity for each agent. The parameters relevant for the princi-
pal's transfer decision include the agents' relative risk-aver-
sion and time-preference rates as well as the production func-
tions and the covariance of the stochastic outputs of the two
agents . Moreover the investment and output of one agent may
generate external benefits that lead to higher investment or more
productive investment of the other agent, i.e. infrastructure
investments of the public agent. In this case it can be expected
that the principal provides "easier" terms of transfer to the
public agent because the induced higher public investments maxi-
mize the overall transfer repayments from both agents. The provi-
sion of guarantees by the public agent that cover the private
agent's transfer obligations constitutes another interdependence
between the two agents that may influence the principal's trans-
fer decision.
For an extension of the principal-agent problem to many agents
see Dilip Mookherjee, Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many
Agents, Review of Economic Studies 51 (1984), 433-446.20
The following analysis focuses on the existence of public
guarantees for the repayments on private external debt. This case
is relevant for LDC-financing because public enterprises play an
important role in these countries and do often operate in the
commercial sector . The reduction of the risk associated with
external debt-financing of the private sector in LDCs through
public guarantees has probably contributed to the rise of debt
and fall of foreign direct investments in development finance.
Moreover the guarantee involves an incentive for the government
to monitor the economic performance of the private firms that
received the guarantee. This public monitoring of private invest-
ment decisions under the domestic legal framework should increase
the private investment incentives. Generating sufficient invest-
ment incentives for the borrowing agent is important for the
principal in maximizing repayments because the investment returns
constitute the basis for the repayments. Thus, consideration of
guarantee schemes seems to be worthwhile.
As already mentioned the analysis is limited to the interdepen-
dence between the public and the private agent that results from
the guarantee. For that reason, it is assumed that the public and
the private agent use identical production technologies which are
subject to the same stochastic disturbances. Both agents try to
maximize their expected utility by making an investment decision
As an example may serve the large share of publicly owned en-
terprises in the mining and oil industries of LDCs. Providing
public guarantees to private debtors can also take the form of
onlending of external loans to private firms by public insti-
tutions, as it seems to be in the case of the Mexican Pemex.
The lending behavior of the creditors may be even changed if
public guarantees are assumed to be implicitly approved by the
government. In Chile international creditors forced the govern-
ment to take over private banks that were unable to meet their
external debts. The international banks argued that the loans
to the Chilean banks had been granted under the assumption of
effective public monitoring of the banks' business policies.
The public guarantee increases the expected value of loans to
private borrowers as long as the government is able to meet its
obligations from the guarantee.21
as in the one-agent model. Differences arise from the investment
incentives of the public guarantee. The guarantee covers all
fixed debt repayments from private borrowers. The first period
transfers to the public and the private sector are taken as given
and fixed. Thus, the principal solves an maximization problem
that is similar to the one in section 3 with the additional fea-
tures of the public guarantee and the existence of two agents.
The principal is only interested in the total expected repayments
from both agents and debt-equity shifts in one agent's repayment
structure must leave the utility of each agent constant .
The analysis proceeds by first analysing the investment incen-
tives of the public and the private agent under the guarantee
scheme. These incentive structures are taken into account by the
principal when he chooses the terms of transfer for the two
agents. The principal's incentives to provide debt and equity
transfers to the public and the private agent are compared to the
principal's incentives in the one-agent model of section 3. With-
out the public guarantee the principal would set the terms of
transfer for each agent according to the one-agent model. Thus,
comparison of the resulting incentives with the one-agent model
determines if the guarantee scheme biases the transfers to the
public and the private agent in favour of debt or equity and if
the bias runs into the same direction for both agents.
Public guarantees may differ with respect to the contractual
obligation of the private firm against the public guarantor if
the principal calls on the guarantee. Two different forms of
guarantee contracts are taken into account. In the first case,
the public guarantee does not involve any future obligations for
the private firm against the government. If the private firm is
unable to meet its fixed debt repayment and the principal calls
on the guarantee, the public payment is in effect an earmarked
Thus, the analysis focuses on pareto improvements in a setting
with three parties, i.e. each agent is treated seperately.22
grant to the private firm. In the second case, the government
acquires an equal claim in domestic currency against the private
firm by making payments in the framework of the guarantee scheme.
In effect the public guarantor buys the foreign debt claim from
the principal using foreign exchange. The foreign claim is
converted into a debt claim against the private firm that has to
be repaid in domestic currency. For both cases it is assumed that
guarantee payments are only made after the government has met its
fixed debt obligation, but that they are privileged against the
government's variable equity obligation .
4.1. Public Guarantees without Conversion of Guarantee Payments
into Domestic Debt
Without the creation of a domestic public claim against the pri-
vate agent guarantees do not change the private agent's calculus
with regard to utility maximization. The model disregards reputa-
tional effects from contractual debt service that would influence
the agent's utility in the case of repeated transfers. The pri-
vate agent services his external debt as far as he is able to do
so. Partial repudiation in the case of low investment returns
does not reduce his utility. For that reason, the compensation of
the principal by the guarantee payments in times of low invest-
ment returns does not influence his utility, too. The analysis
for the private agent is equivalent to the model in section 3.
Specifically, the guarantee does not lead to more risky invest-
ments .
For the public agent the guarantee implies expected payments in
the second period that reduce his second period consumption
(EC,,,.) . The expected guarantee payments (PG) are dependent on the
GJ
private agent's fixed debt obligation (D) and the private agent's
expected second period output.
A government may have equity obligations from joint ventures of
public enterprises with foreign firms that have already taken










PG = F(Ip) J (d-x)g(x)dx >_ 0 [Gl]
F(Ip)
= I* = Ip
The expected guarantee payments vary with changes in the struc-
ture of the private debt and equity obligations. Obviously,
higher private fixed debt (D) directly increases PG. Contrary,
the private investment response to more debt has a reducing
effect on PG because the higher debt obligation increases the






















= / g(x)dx - F'(Ip) _ j xg(x)dx j 0 [G2]
5D o
> 0
Changes in the principal's equity share of the private agent's
output (1-Q) cause only an indirect effect working along the
private investment response.24
5I- ' xg(x)dx <. 0 [G3]
5(1-Q)
The private agent's investment response to variations of D and
(1-Q) is equivalent to the model in section 3 [F5 and F6] because
the public guarantee without debt conversion does not change the
private agent's utility maximization calculus. The indeterminate
sign of 5PG/5D can be resolved by economic reasoning with regard
to the private agent's second period consumption under pure debt
finance (Q=l).
ECp2 = j F(Ip) (x-d) g(x)dx
d d
= F(Ip) {[1 - C xg(x)dx] - d[l - C g(x)dx]
= F(Ip:
= PG > 0
The private agent's positive investment response to an increase
of D implies the reduction of the agent's first period consump-
tion. The second period consumption is determined by the direct
negative effect from the increased debt and the indirect effect
from the agent's investment response. Assuming that 5PG/5D < 0
leads to the result that the agent's investment response reduces
second period consumption even further because of the induced
decrease of PG. An investment decision that decreases consumption
in both periods is clearly non-optimal. Thus, the increase of
fixed private debt results in higher expected guarantee payments
of the public agent.25
The effect of the expected guarantee payments on the public
agent's investment behavior corresponds to the one from fixed
debt obligations. The guarantee payments are privileged against
the variable equity obligation and are subject to repudiation as
the fixed debt if the public agent's second period output is too
low. An increase or decrease of PG has the same incentive effects
as the corresponding movement of B, the fixed debt claim against
the public agent.
The analysis of the principal's calculus deals in the first place
with the determination of the value of the guarantee for the
principal. This value is different from the expected guarantee
payments of the public agent. For the principal the guarantee
value is determined by the probability of full or partial repu-
diation by the private agent and the probability of a sufficient
ability to pay on the side of the public guarantor in these
cases. Furthermore, the principal must take into account the
expected losses on the variable equity claim against the public
agent in the case of guarantee payments. In the following, the
expected values of the fixed and variable claims against the
public and the private agent are derived and separated into basic
terms that are equivalent to the one-agent model of section 3 and
additional terms that are due to the introduction of the public
guarantee.
Expected value of the private fixed debt claim:
} I t T
VD = D[ I g(x)dx + / g(x)dx] + F(Ip) / xg(x)dx + F(IG) J (x-b)g(x)dx
d b+pg o b
PG
pg = F(IG)26
The first term represents the expected value of full repayment of
the private fixed claim by either the private agent [x_ >. d <=>
xn F(I_) > D] or the public guarantor [x,, > b +pg < = > x,, F(I_) >
rr G — G G
B + PG] . The public agent's output xF(I_.) must exceed B + PG to
G
ensure that the guarantee covers the expected shortfall of the
private agent's output in times when the guarantee is called on.
The private agent's output falls short of the fixed debt claim
with the probability j g(x)dx and the expected output in this
case is equal to D - PG; thus, the_existence of the public guar-
antee leads with probability ,+ y
xg(x)dx to an expected full re-
payment of the private fixed debt. The second and third term
describe the partial repayment of the private fixed debt with the
private agent contributing all of his output and the public agent
serving the guarantee with the output that exceeds his own fixed
debt obligation.
Expected value of the private variable equity claim:
x
VQ = (1-Q) F(Ip) / (x-d) g(x)dx
* d
The private equity claim is not affected by the introduction of
the public guarantee because this claim is only relevant in times
when the private agent's output is sufficiently high to meet the
fixed debt claim and, thus, the guarantee does not come into
effect.
Expected value of the public fixed debt claim:
x
VB = F(I.) [1 - f (x-b) g(x)dx]
G b
7
The guarantee does not change the value of the public debt claim
because the public agent is obliged to meet his debt obligation
first before making payments with respect to the guarantee. For
that reason the term is equivalent to the basic model.27
Expected value of the public variable equity claim:
x d
VT1 = (l-n) F(IG) f (x-b)g(x)dx - (l-n)F(Ip) f (d-x)g(x)dx
b o
Guarantee payments affect the public agent's ability to pay in
the same way as fixed debt repayments. The expected output that
remains after the debt service provides the basis for the equity
claim in the basic model (first term); this term must be reduced
by the expected public guarantee payments in the modified model
(second term). If the principal calls on the guarantee because of
the private agent's inability to pay, he gains the full guarantee
payments on the side of the private agents, but looses (1-n)
times the guarantee payments on the side of the public agent.
The expected values of the total repayments from the private and
the public agent are derived by adding the respective terms:
x b+pg x





term from the basic model effect of the guarantee >_ 0
x d
VT. = F(IJ [l-n /(x-b)g(x)dx - (l-n) F(ID) f (d-x)g(x)dx] [G5]
term from the basic model effect of the guarantee £ 0
The principal tries to maximize the expected value of the overall
repayments by choosing optimal combinations of fixed and variable
claims against the private and the public agent. Thereby, varia-
tions in the repayment structure of one agent must leave the
expected utility of the public and the private agent constant.
The principal can approach this maximization problem by first
choosing the private structure that maximizes the private claim
subject to the utility constraint. Based on this first step the28
optimal transfer structure for the public claim is determined.
This sequential approach is possible because only variations of
the private fixed and variable claim affect the utility of both
agents, with the expected guarantee payments serving as the link
between the private repayment obligations and the utility of the
public agent. Changes in the equity obligation of the private
agent influence the expected guarantee payments because of the
private agent's investment response. On the other hand, changes
of the fixed and variable claim against the public agent leave
the private•agent's utility unchanged. The maximization of the
principal's public claims does not interfere with the expected
value of the private transfer repayments. Thus, the principal's
incentives for choosing the fixed debt and variable equity claim
against the public agent in the secod step of the maximization
procedure are equivalent to the preceding one-agent model.
For that reason the following paragraphs concentrate on the addi-
tional effects from the public guarantee with regard to the opti-
mal debt-equity structure of the private repayments. Without the
guarantee the private debt-equity structure is also determined by
the principal's incentives as derived from the one-agent model .
The change in the relative profitability of debt and equity
claims for the principal can only result from the additional
terms that are due to the introduction of the guarantee. Thus,
the first step identifies the value increasing effect from the
guarantee on the principal's private claims and analyses the
impact of changes in the principal's debt and equity claims
against the private agent on the guarantee value. Changes of the
guarantee value for the principal imply changes in the expected
guarantee payments for the public agent, who's utility must stay
constant. The second step deals with the necessary compensation
that must be provided by the principal to the public agent to
keep his utility level in the case of changing expected guarantee
This fact is reflected in the first term of VTp which is equi-
valent to the general formulation of the expected value of the
combined fixed and variable claim in the one-agent model.29
payments. The last step summarizes the effects from the guarantee
and the compensation on the principal's profit maximizaton calcu-
lus and draws some conclusions on the principal's incentives for
debt and equity financing.
The effect of the public guarantee on the expected value of the
principal's combined fixed and variable claims against the pri-
vate agent is given as
b+pg x
GED = F(I_) / (x-b) g(x)dx + D / g(x)dx [G6]
b b+pg
The analysis again focusses on conditions that provide incentives
for the principal to shift the private debt-equity structure in
favour of debt claims. If high debt-equity ratios raise the value
of the public guarantee for the principal (GE ), the conditions
are more favourable for an increase of private debt to have also
a positive impact on the value of the whole private repayments.
Shifts towards higher debt claims are accompanied with reductions
of the equity claim to ensure constant utility of the private
agent. The guarantee effect makes an increase of D more likely to
increase the expected private transfer repayments if the follow-
ing inequality is met:
SGE 5GE 5EUp/5D
1 -
 v > 0 [G7]
5D (5(1-Q) 5EUp/5(l-Q)
As it is shown in Appendix II [G7] reduces to
x
/~ g(x)dx > 0 [G8]
b+pg
This inequality is met, as long as the public agent's fixed debt
obligation and his expected guarantee payments does not fully
exhaust the maximal possible second period output of the public
agent [b+pg<x < = > B+PG<xF (I,,) ] . As far as the utility from pri-30
vate repayments is concerned the introduction of the public
guarantee is a favourable precondition for the principal to shift
from variable equity claims to fixed debt claims.
This favourable effect is opposed by the reduction of the princi-
pal's fixed debt claim against the public agent that is necessary
to compensate the public guarantor for the increase of the ex-
pected guarantee payments resulting from higher private fixed
debt. The reduction of the public fixed debt is given by the
effect of the increase in D and the associated reduction of (1-Q)
on PG, the expected guarantee payments.
SPG
























In section 3 it has been argued that the agent's investment re-
sponse to an increase of the variable claim is smaller than in
the case of increased debt because of the substitution effect.
Combining this consideration with the fact that the ratio of the
marginal utilities is smaller than one allows to state that
5P
G = f g(x)dx - H > 0, with H > 0, d > 0
6D U const.
P
The overall effect on PG from a shift of the private debt-equity
structure towards guaranteed debt must be positive. Otherwise the
principal would gain by restructuring the privat repayment struc-
ture and, in addition, would be able to increase the public31
agent's fixed debt leaving the public agent's utility unchanged.
In the case of no private debt (d = 0) the above derivate is
equal to zero.
The principal raises the expected value of the private repayments
by substituting guaranteed fixed debt claims for variable equity
claims as long as the reduction of the public fixed claim does
not exceed the increase of the claim against the private agent.
The increase of the private claim is derived in [G8]. The loss on
the side of the public agent is given by
3T fp I Of
1







= -n / g(x)dx • ( y"g(x)dx - H) with n = 1 [G10]
b o
The evaluation of the principal's loss requires that n is set
equal to one because the reduction of the fixed debt claim does
not increase the public agent's ability to pay in terms of the
variable equity claim. The expected equity repayments are cal-
culated on the basis of the agent's second period output after
allowing for the fixed repayment obligations of the agent (fixed
debt and expected guarantee payments). In the case of the re-
duction of the public agent's fixed debt as a mean of compen-
sation for the increase of the expected guarantee payments the
deduction from the second period output stays constant and the
expected value of the variable equity claim remains unchanged.
Thus, the effect is equivalent to the reduction of the fixed debt
claim under the assumption that no variable equity claim exists
(n = 1) .
It must be kept in mind that these effects are additional to
those already derived in the one-agent model of section 3. Com-
paring the terms of [G8] and [G10] the following conclusions can
be drawn:32
From the model without a public guarantee in section 3 it has
been derived that the first transfer to the agent is optimally
provided as an equity transfer. Further equity transfers de-
crease the profitability of equity relative to debt transfers.
For the first transfer to the private agent under the guarantee
scheme the inequality [G8] is strictly positive and [G10] is
equal to zero. Thus, the guarantee leads to more favourable
conditions for the first debt transfer. Unfortunately, it is
not possible to determine if the higher profitability of debt
transfers will motivate the principal to stop equity transfers
at all and provide already the first transfer to the private
agent in the form of debt. If this is not the case, the guaran-
tee at least causes the shift from equity to debt transfers to
occur at a lower level of equity transfers.
In the case of debt transfers being more favourable for the
principal than equity transfers the model in section 3 leads to
the result that the emerging debt transfers strengthen the
profitability of debt even further. Contrary, under the public
guarantee scheme the profitability of shifts from private equi-
ty to debt claims by the principal is decreasing with the in-
crease of private debt and the effect can even be reversed when
the private debt claim becomes too high. Thus, the incentive
for the principal in the one-agent to increase further debt
transfers at the expense of equity after debt transfers have
taken place is weakened under the guarantee scheme.
The above reasoning with regard to the structure of transfers
to the private agent is independent from the debt-equity
structure of the transfer to the public agent. According to the
sequential approach the principal determines the optimal struc-
ture of his public claims after the maximization of his private
claims including the compensation of the public agent. The
principal's incentives for choosing the structure of transfers
to the public agent are given by the analysis of the one-agent
model of section 3.33
4.2. Public Guarantees with Conversion of Guarantees Payments
into Domestic Debt
The guarantees that have been analysed in the preceding section
had rather common contractual features. Because the guarantee did
not take the form of an insurance with a fee that covers the
expected costs, it was like an earmarked grant that lowers the
utility of the guarantor. Furthermore, this guarantee did not
affect the investment calculus of the private agent. The model
analyses only a single transfer/repayment process and leaves no
room for the agent's reputation from past transfer repayments,
possibly by guarantee payments. The private agent does not care
whether or not the principal gets the repayment. He is only in-
terested if the inability to meet the transfer obligation leaves
him with any obligation to repay in the future. The private
agent's investment calculus may change if public guarantee pay-
ments lead to the creation of a new domestic claim against the
private agent that compensates the public agent for his guarantee
payments. Under this condition the private agent must consider
all possible outputs of his investment and cannot disregard the
low outputs that result in full or partial default on the trans-
fer repayments.
The following paragraphs discuss the scheme of a public guarantee
that is characterized by the special feature that the guarantor
receives a domestic claim against the private agent in the case
of guarantee payments. The claim takes the form of a fixed debt
denominated in domestic currency with the value being equivalent
to the effected guarantee payments in foreign currency. This
domestic claim serves to compensate the guarantor for the guaran-
tee payments and may leave the public agent without any loss from
the guarantee if the expected value of the domestic claim fully
meets the value of the guarantee payments in domestic currency.
This extreme result takes place if the private agent's inability
to pay is purely due to temporary illiquidity. Because interna-
tional lenders find it difficult to differentiate between illi-
quidity, insolvency, and unwillingness to pay when they have to
assess the reason for the borrower's inability to pay, the lend-34
ing principal may not be willing to reschedule repayments even in
cases of temporary illiquidity. Under this condition the prin-
cipal can call on the public guarantee irrespective of the reason
for the private agent's inability to pay. Thus, in the presence
of differences between the lending principal and the public agent
with regard to the available- information on the true reason for
the private agent's default or the technology for enforcing
claims, public guarantees can serve as an instrument to deal with
this asymmetries.
In the following it is assumed that the expected value of the
domestic claim is equivalent to the guarantee payments measured
in domestic currency. With perfect domestic capital markets the
public agent is able to transform this domestic claim into pre-
sent consumption that is equivalent to the forgone consumption
resulting from the guarantee payments. Thus, the funds available
to the public agent from his domestic point of view are not af-
fected by the guarantee payment made in foreign currency. But a
transfer problem emerges with regard to the public variable equi-
ty obligation. The variable equity claim is based on the bor-
rower's ability to pay in foreign currency after the deduction of
his fixed foreign currency obligations. The guarantee payment
reduces the public agent's foreign exchange position and repre-
sents a fixed obligation in the case of a call on the public
guarantee by the principal. The domestic claim is sufficient to
keep the public agent's utility constant, that depends on his
domestic consumption opportunities, but does not restore the
public agent's foreign exchange position. Thus, the public agent
enjoys a shelter for his domestic claim against the variable
equity obligation. Given these repayment characteristics guaran-
tee payments do not only leave the public agent with a constant
utility, but increase his utility because the guarantee payment
in foreign currency reduces his variable equity obligation. This
applies as long as the principal does not take measures that
"compensate" the public agent in a negative sense to keep his
utility constant. It can be stated that an increase of the ex-
pected guarantee payments of the public agent ( PG > 0) has the
same effect as a reduction of the fixed debt claim (- B = PG)35
with the absolute variable equity repayment staying constant.
terms of the public agent's expected utility this results in
In
5EU 5EU
= - (1-n) [
SPG 5B
] >. 0 [Gil]
n=i
On the side of the private agent the conversion of guarantee
payments into domestic fixed debt claims modifies the utility in
the second period. In the case of public guarantee payments the
private agent ends up with a negative end-of-period wealth be-
cause of the existence of the domestic claim against him. It is
assumed that the disutility of the negative end-of-period wealth
is equivalent, but with the opposite sign, to the utility from
second-period consumption of equal seize. The expected second-
period consumption can thus be written as
ECp2 = EQp - D - (x-d)g(x)dx
XX X
f (x-d)g(x)dx - / (x-d)g(x)dx + Q f <x-d)g(x)dx]
J d d
y
EC_ =F(I_)[ /'(x-djgfxjdx + Q / (x-d)g(x)dx]
P
2
 P o^ d
y
[G12]
Under the previous guarantee scheme without conversion the
private agent's consumption and utility were equivalent to the
basic one-agent model ([F1]-[F4]). The conversion of guarantee
payments into domestic debt reduces the private agent's expected
second-period consumption as long as fixed debt is positive.
Consequently, the utility of the private agent is lower than
under the previous guarantee scheme. Comparing the partial deri-
vatives of the private agent's expected utility with respect to
'1-Q' and 'D' under the two guarantee schemes (4.1 and 4.2) the
following conclusions can be derived:36
Because the utility level is lower and the marginal utility is
decreasing, the marginal disutility of an increase of the var-
iable equity claim with the fixed debt claim constant is
greater under the guarantee scheme with conversion into domes-






For increased fixed debt claims with constant equity claims the
same reasoning applies. Additionally, higher fixed debt in-
creases the expected guarantee payments of the public agent
and, thus, the domestic claim against the private agent. This
effect increases the disutility resulting from higher fixed






To keep the private agent's utility constant in the case of
shifts of the terms of transfer the principal must combine the
increase of the fixed debt claim with a reduction of the var-
iable equity claim. The necessary reduction fo the private
agent's equity obligation follows from the ratio of the margi-
nal disutilities [6EUp/5D]/[5EUp/5(1-Q)] (see condition [G7]).
It is assumed that the ratio of the marginal disutilities in-
creases under the guarantee scheme with conversion. It is like-
ly that the reduction of 5EU /5D dominates the decrease of
5EU_/6(l-Q). The decrease of the absolute utility level is the
same in both cases and the effect on the marginal utilities
should be comparable, too. Therefore, the additional effect
from the domestic debt claim should be decisive:37





Up to this point the effects of the guarantee scheme with a con-
version of guarantee payments into domestic claims of the guar-
antor on the utilities of the public and the private agent have
been discussed. The lending principal's incentive to maximize his
expected repayments in a sequential process as it was described
in section 4.1 is not affected by the new guarantee scheme. For
that reason the analysis proceeds by looking again at the princi-
pal's incentives to substitute private fixed debt for the private
equity claim when the new incentives and marginal utilities of
the public and the private agent are taken into account. The
shift in the transfer structure must leave the utility of both
agents constant. As in section 4.1 the analysis covers only the
additional effects from the public guarantee and must be combined
with the incentives from the basic one-agent model of section 3
to form a full picture of the relative profitability of fixed
debt versus variable equity claims for the principal.
In section 4.1 the incentive for substituting guaranteed private
debt for equity claims results from the increase of the expected
private transfer repayments and is always positive as the inequa-
lity [G8] shows. Clearly, the terms of this inequality are not
affected by the introduction of the conversion of the guarantee
payments into domestic private debt. Therefore, differences be-
tween the two guarantee schemes must result from the opposite
effect of reducing the public fixed debt in order to compensate
the public agent for the increased expected guarantee payments
that has been captures by the inequality [G10] in section 4.1.
Given the assumptions about the expected value of the domestic
claim against the private agent the public agent's utility is
increased by higher expected guarantee payments. The domestic
claim does fully compensate for the guarantee payments and it is
excluded from calculation of the variable equity repayments (see
[Gil]).38
Consequently, the principal must increase the public fixed debt
to ensure constant utility of the public agent. The incentive to
shift from equity towards debt claims against the private agent,
as it is given by [G8], is thus not opposed by the disincentive
from the necessary compensation of the public agent as in section
4.1, but even strengthened because constant utility of the public
agent requires higher public debt. This leads to the conclusion
that the guarantee scheme with conversion does always increase
the incentive for the principal to substitute debt claims for
equity claims on the side of the private agent compared to the
basic one-agent model.
Summing up, the principal's sequential maximization of his total,
private and public, expected transfer repayments leads to the
following results:
The maximization of the combined fixed and variable claims
against the private agent, which constitutes the first step in
the sequential process, causes a higher debt-equity ratio on
the side of the private agent than in the case of the guarantee
scheme without conversion into domestic claims or without any
guarantee scheme.
- Under the guarantee scheme with conversion of public guarantee
payments into domestic debt claims the higher private debt
increases the public agent's utility if there is no "compensa-
tion". Keeping the public agent's utility constant requires an
increase of public debt. Thus, after the first step of the
principal's sequential maximization the public agent's repay-
ments are characterized by higher fixed debt with an unchanged
equity claim compared to the result under the public guarantee
scheme without conversion after this first step and the optimal
public debt-equity ratio in the one-agent model.
- The second step of the sequential solution to the principal's
maximization problem requires that the expected value of the
combined fixed and variable claim against the public agent is39
maximized according to the analysis of the one-agent model. The
analysis in section 3 (without guarantees) has shown that
higher debt obligations of the agent have a positive effect on
the judgement of further restructuring the debt-equity struc-
ture towards the debt claim. The increased public debt obliga-
tion that results from the first step of the principal's maxi-
mization calculus strengthens the principal's incentive to rely
on fixed debt rather than variable equity claims when choosing
the debt-equity ratio that maximizes his expected repayments
from the public agent. The resulting public debt-equity ratio
is also higher than in the case with a guarantee without con-
version of guarantee payments into domestic claims, because in
this case the maximization of the private claims induces a
reduction of the public agent's fixed debt in the first step.
4.3. Investment Incentives of the Public and the Private Agent
under the Guarantee Schemes: A Summary
The principal-agent model by Lachler provided a first analysis of
the agent's investment incentives under debt and equity finance.
It was found that debt finance generally leads to higher invest-
ment than equity finance with the marginal effects of higher debt
and equity shares on the agent's investment being both positive.
The derivation of the result was based on the assumption that the
agent maximizes his utility by choosing the optimal investment
subject to the constraint that the principal's expected transfer
repayment value stays constant. This result does also apply to
the case of the principal maximizing his expected transfer repay-
ment value subject to constant utility of the agent as economic
reasoning in section 3 showed.
Returning to the problem of development finance it can be con-
cluded that developing countries should be able to increase do-
mestic investment and growth by offering in renegotiations on
their repayments public guarantees that increase the incentives
of the international creditors and investors (the principals) to40
provide higher debt financing relative to equity. The improvement
that can be achieved by introducing public guarantees has to be
evaluated against the principal's transfer decision in a setting
without guarantees.
A short review of the Lachler model shows that the transfer
structure as it is determined in this model does not provide the
appropriate point of reference. In the Lachler model the agent's
investment response to changes in the structure of finance is
only relevant in the non-cooperative principal-agent situation .
In this case the principal accepts only a restricted set of terms
of transfer. The possible combinations of debt und equity repay-
ments are derived from the constraint that each debt-equity
structure must lead to the same value of expected repayments.
Additionally, the expected investment used in the calculation of
the expected repayment results from maximizing the agent's utili-
ty function given the terms of transfer. The agent chooses from
the restricted set the debt-equity structure that maximizes his
utility. Thereby the agent faces the risk sharing growth trade-
off mentioned by Lachler because each debt-equity ratio implies a
specific optimal investment. It is important to note that gains
from changes in the debt-equity structure fully accrue to the
agent. Thus, in the Lachler model the principal has no incentive
to engage in renegotiations on the terms of transfer that may
lead to increased investments.
The introduction of guarantees that change the relative profita-
bility of debt and equity transfers can only influence the trans-
fer structure if the principal aims at maximizing repayments.
Therefore, the reference for evaluating the guarantee effect's on
the agent's investment incentives is given by the principal-agent
framework of section 3. The restructuring of the repayments to-
wards debt results in increased investments. The introduction of
guarantee schemes is favourable in this respect if it increases
In the cooperative case the risk-avers agent relies on pure
equity finance and, thus, the principal has no means to in-
fluence the investment decision.41
the profitability of debt claims for the principal compared to
equity claims. Thereby the debt-equity ratios of the public and
the private agent must be judged separately with reference to the
one-agent model with a profit maximizing principal.
The public guarantee without the conversion of guarantee payments
(section 4.1) into domestic claims does not lead to a clear-cut
result on this issue. Starting with the private agent who has not
received any transfers yet the guarantee increases the profitabi-
lity of debt claims for the principal. But the one-agent model of
section 3 results in pure equity finance being optimal for the
principal in this situation. If the principal provides equity
financing in the beginning, the analysis of section 3 shows that
the relative profitability of further pure equity finance de-
creases. This process in favour of additional debt finance is
strengthened by the guarantee scheme in the beginning. The in-
crease of private fixed debt diminishes the favourable influence
from the guarantee on shifts towards a higher debt-equity ratio.
In the case of high private debt the guarantee effect can even
run in favour of increased equity claims. While in the one-agent
model high equity and high debt claims both lead to more favour-
able conditions for further debt finance by the principal, the
introduction of the public guarantee a la 4.1 creates an indefi-
niteness with respect to the direction of the principal's incen-
tives when the agent's repayment obligations are increasing or
already high. Because the effect on the private agent's debt-
equity structure is indeterminate, the resulting debt-equity
structure of the public agent cannot be determined too.
The investment effects of the guarantee scheme with the conver-
sion of guarantee payments into domestic claims can be derived
from the summary of section 4.2. The principal chooses higher
debt-equity ratios for the repayments of both agents as in the
one-agent model. Each agent increases investment under this con-
dition because the utility maximization calculus that determines42
the single agent's investment in the two agent model does not
differ from the one-agent model. On the side of the private agent
the potential conversion of guarantee payments strengthens the
investment incentives that result from higher international debt.
The failure of investment projects in the one-agent model lead to
the partial repudiation of the debt claim and the maximal loss of
the agent is represented by second period consumption of zero.
Thus, the costs of an investment strategy with low investment
that implies higher probability of an insufficient second period
output are reduced. The introduction of the domestic claim eli-
minates the cost reducing effect from repudiation. The agent
bears the full costs of his investment decision. This fact
strengthens his investment incentives.
The analysis indicates that governments can use the instrument of
public guarantees to promote higher investment of the private
sector. Additionally, the resulting higher debt-equity ratio of
the public agent's repayments creates a credible incentive for
the government to increase its own investments too. These devel-
opments should have a favourable effect on growth prospects and
the country's creditworthiness.Appendix I:
The case of a risk-neutral agent
In this case the agent's investment stays constant after an
increase of the fixed debt claim and responds negatively to an
increase of the variable equity claim { [F5] and [F6] with U'






g(x)dx > n f g(x)dx.
Because of the additional positive term from [Fll] all debt fi-
nance is prefered by the principal in every case. This indicates
that also with risk-avers agents the fact of low risk-aversion
should make it more likely that the principal's repayments are
maximized by choosing higher fixed debt instead of variable
equity claims.Appendix II;
The effects of changes in the principal's private debt and equity
claims on the value of the public guarantee for the principal
(GEp) in [G7]
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The effect of private debt on public investment 51 /5D is
indirect and runs over the changes of the expected guarantee
payments (PG) that are caused by the variations of the private
debt claim. This effect affects the public agent's utility. The
sequential solution requires that the changes of the expected
guarantee payments are offset by opposite changes of the public
agent's fixed debt to keep the public agent's utility constant.
Expected guarantee payments and fixed debt obligations have the
same utility and incentive effects. Hence, the overall position
of the public agent remains unchanged and the investment response
5I_/5D is equal to zero in the case of compensating fixed debt
adjustment.
The same reasoning applies to 5(b+pg)/5D with
B+PG